Dickins, D. W. (2022). Bliss in that dawn: The beginnings of operant psychology in the UK History & Philosophy of Psychology, 23(1), 33-49. doi:10.53841/bpshpp.2022.23.1.33
[Abstract]Although the first research in the UK to achieve what amounted to operant conditioning (Grindley, 1932) was published in the same year as Skinner’s pioneer publication no similar procedure seems to have been carried out in Britain until Hurwitz founded an operant laboratory at Birkbeck, (then Birkbeck College), University of London, in the early 1950s, presumably inspired by his meeting with Skinner in 1951, and their subsequent friendship. It certainly was an import from America, fortified by local solutions for providing suitable control equipment. The author was a student of Hurwitz at Birkbeck (1957–1961) and was researching (1961–1964) close by at University College (UCL). There follows a largely biographical account of how operant conditioning, initially mostly in rats, spread around universities in the UK. Many of the people concerned, and others not mentioned, shared their ideas at meetings of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group (EABG) that informally sprang up in the early 1960s, initially without funding or its own journal. In coordination with the later emergence of the European Association for Behaviour Analysis (EABA) and its associated journal (European Journal of Behaviour Analysis) the organisation of the EABG has become established in Bangor, and holds regular biennial meetings at University College, London, alternating with those of the EABA in other parts of Europe. The EABG continues to attract many foreign attendees, including from the US, but some of its earlier enthusiasts no longer attend, whilst those attending mostly see themselves as Behaviour Analysts, reflecting changes both in the theory and practice of operant psychology. While operant technology remains a useful tool for those seeking a broad biological and authentic evolutionary understanding of behaviour, the philosophy of operant psychology as an all-encompassing approach to behavioural science has proved divisive.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (1996a)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  

Graham, G. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924 - 2 January 2000. Brain and Mind, 1, 181-182. doi:10.1023/A:1010032528485
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1992d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  

Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759425
[Abstract]Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1982)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1997b)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf

Moore, J. (2000). Words Are Not Things. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 143-160. doi:10.1007/BF03392961
[Abstract]On a traditional view, words are the fundamental units of verbal behavior. They are independent, autonomous things that symbolically represent or refer to other independent, autonomous things, often in some other dimension. Ascertaining what those other things are constitutes determining the meaning of a word. On a behavior-analytic view, verbal behavior is ongoing, functional operant activity occasioned by antecedent factors and reinforced by its consequences, particularly consequences that are mediated by other members of the same verbal community. Functional relations rather than structure select the response unit. The behavior-analytic point of view clarifies such important contemporary issues in psychology as (a) the role of scientific theories and explanations, (b) educational practices, and (c) equivalence classes, so that there is no risk of strengthening the traditional view that words are things that symbolically represent other things.
[Citing Place (1981a) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b) in context]  [Citing Place (1982) in context]  [Citing Place (1983d) in context]  

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BP-v50-Place.pdf
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1984a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1985c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  [Citing Place (1998c)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1999)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Citing Place (1999g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Reed, P. (2022). The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/BPv50-Reed.pdf
[Abstract]The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises nonscientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
Note:
Place (2022) argues that this article is a rather misleading exposition of Ullin T. Place's work on intensionality and the types of language in behavioural science.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Reed (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
[Abstract]Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior has received an unwarranted amount of criticism over the years, and the recently published reviews of Verbal Behavior by U. T. Place contribute to this body of negative literature. It is argued that Place, like those before him, has failed to appreciate several critical features of behaviorism and Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. Place's "four major defects in Verbal Behavior" are reviewed and analyzed. The results seem to indicate that Place's dissatisfaction with the book would be greatly reduced by a better understanding of Skinner's work.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Sundberg & Michael (1983) A Response to U T Place.pdf